This paper looks at the validity of two tightly interrelated linguistic dogmas. 
Introduction: even eternal truths are not what they used to be
Outside grammar, there are not very many 'eternal truths' in the science of linguistics. Arguably, that duality (i.e. dyadic orientation) is a basic feature of human communication, is one of them, and that meaning is always negotiated meaning, is another. These two dogmas are tightly interrelated. They cohere because negotiating meaning is dyadic by nature in that it is a transitive and reciprocal act requiring two interactants. Hence, the dyadic character of human communication is an indispensable precondition for semiosis, i.e. the act or process of meaning-making (in the Peircean sense).
As is sometimes the case with everlasting truths, however, an unforeseeable change of their conditional fundaments can lead to their erosion. As I will argue in my paper, this appears to have happened with duality as a dogmatic feature of human communication. Since the advent of the new electronic media, it has been subject to a process of gradual erosion and is no longer unrestrictedly valid for both 'old' (spoken and written) and 'new' electronic media. Some forms of computer mediated communication (CMC) in particular have altered our understanding of participation as a dyadic and focussed concept, and have also made negotiating meaning and thus understanding more difficult. The latter may come as a surprise because the possibilities of the electronically administered new media with their literally infinite number of audio-visual data are widely regarded as an asset rather than as an impediment to composition and thought. But, as we will see, the interactive potential of CMC is (at least partly) counteracted by the high degree of fragmentarization (with all its consequences). Thus, despite its extraordinary possibilities, interacting with this new medium does not per se guarantee easier understanding, i.e. an easier access to the world 'behind the screen' than when interacting with old media. In actual fact, the user's situation is not essentially different from the familiar situation of the reader who, when reading a book, a handbook or a newspaper, is trying to understand, i.e. to create his or her own inner world.
Communication is not as dyadic as is generally assumed
Among the long-established dogmas that spring to mind when studying how communication works is the following: Human communication is most obviously characterised by its speaker/writer -hearer/reader symmetry, i.e. its dual or dyadic orientation. To communicate means for someone to communicate with someone else; it is a reciprocal act. 1 As a fundamental principle, this timehonoured dictum has seldom been queried in its entirety, though every now and then in some of its aspects (as I will show presently). A succinct description was provided by Wilhelm von Humboldt. In an article about dual as a grammatical number (besides singular and plural), he reflected in a more general way on duality as a universal communicative principle:
Besonders entscheidend für die Sprache ist es, daß die Zweiheit in ihr eine wichtigere Stelle, als irgendwo sonst, einnimmt. Alles Sprechen ruht auf der Wechselrede, in der, auch unter Mehreren, der Redende die Angeredeten immer sich als Einheit gegenüberstellt. [...] Es liegt aber in dem ursprünglichen Wesen der Sprache ein unabänderlicher Dualismus, und die Möglichkeit des Sprechens selbst wird durch Anrede und Erwiderung bedingt. (1827/1969: 138) Duality is the most obvious defining feature of two-party talk as the archetypical kind of spoken face-to-face communication in a homogeneous and focussed social setting. Human verbal communication is by nature dialogic. At closer inspection, however, neither the prototypical speaker nor the prototypical hearer are monolithic concepts but fusions of various conceptual roles. To take a simple example from the production side of verbal interchange: The speaker, the author and the source of a piece of text can be three different persons (e.g., a government spokesman reading out a secretary's account of a cabinet minister's ideas to a journalist), two different persons (the secretary reading out her own account of a cabinet minister's ideas to a journalist), or just one person (the cabinet minister telling the journalist herself her ideas). Or, focussing on the reception side, that the hearer of an utterance is not necessarily its addressee (i.e.
